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Clay Boyce left the U.S. Air Force in 1955, and joined Aerojet 
at its Azusa, California facility. After the launch of Russia’s 
Sputnik Program, he joined the Thor/Able Second Stage 
Program, an adaptation of the Vanguard second stage. 
Subsequently, he participated in the conceptual design 
and development of the AbleStar upper stage. Variations of 
this stage are still flying. In 1960, he was assigned to the 
Win Apollo team and, then, became engineering manager of the Apollo Service Propulsion 
System (SPS) engine development. In 1969, he was assigned to NASA’s Johnson Space 
Center in Texas for technical support of the SPS engine. Later assignments included the 
Space Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering System engine, the Japanese N-2 Upper Stage, and the 
National Aerospace Plane. Boyce retired from Aerojet in 1991, and has provided consulting 
services to the company since that time. 
 
Some of the most tense times I ever had were on the Apollo mission. The question I always 
got asked the most when somebody talked about it was, “What if the service module engine 
doesn’t start, especially when the astronauts are ready to come home?” I will tell you why it was 
tense. I knew it would start, but until that first mid-course firing on the way to the moon, I 
didn’t know if they had connected it right. Once I got a firing signal, I knew they had mated 
the connectors properly in place.
Our Apollo proposal effort started for me in 1960. The Thor AbleStar vehicle was being devel-
oped then (See Slide 3, Appendix G). We used technology like the titanium nozzle for the 
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SPS engine. I was partying in a swimming pool down in Florida just after the second Able-
Star launch when they came and got me about 3 a.m. and said, “We booked you a flight out 
of Orlando, 7 a.m. Be in Philadelphia, go to General Electric, find the Apollo group, and tell 
them our engine is the best.” That was my first introduction to the word “Apollo” in the space 
program.
We had written twenty-nine proposals to twelve different primes (contractors competing for 
Apollo), and all but one of them selected our engine. We had a pretty good chance of winning 
the job. The engine was the same height as a space shuttle main engine, and the exit diameter 
was slightly larger than the space shuttle main engine (See Slide 5, Appendix G). The size was 
set before Apollo adopted the Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) mission approach. Prior to the 
LEM, the whole Command Module was to be landed on the moon, and this engine would 
have been the engine to lift it off the moon and return it to Earth. I would have had to wait a 
long time for that first firing, if they had followed the original concept. Aerojet was awarded 
the Apollo SPS engine development contract in April 1962, and the final decision on LEM 
was made about November or December of that year. We had proceeded far enough that 
even though they went to the LEM concept, they decided it wasn’t worth starting over with a 
smaller, lower-thrust engine, so they kept the large size. The large size resulted because it was 
specified to be a pressure-fed engine. They didn’t want to have to worry about the reliability 
of pumps and everything on the moon at that time. It was a 20,000-pound-force (lbf ) thrust 
engine, but it was as big as a space shuttle main engine (SSME). Chamber pressure was only 
100 pounds per square inch (psi). The major change that it made from the mockup was at the 
head-end, gimbaled configuration was changed to a throat-gimbaled design, which reduced 
the overall height of the Saturn vehicle when they put the LEM in behind the service module. 
The throat gimbaling of the engine saved about three and one-half to four feet of overall vehicle 
length and weight.
The technology we had at that time was the Saint/Apollo subscale engine (See Slide 4, Appendix 
G). It was for a satellite interceptor system for the Air Force. It used what we called earth-stor-
able propellants, N2O4 (dinitrogen tetroxide, a powerful oxidizer) and some of the hydrazine 
families, because the Saint Program actually was an in-orbit satellite that was supposed to be 
able to detect an orbiting enemy satellite and go after it. That program was started in 1957-
1958. It never flew because the computer capabilities and the control system it required just 
weren’t mature enough to do it. But, we did build the ablative engine, the biggest at that time 
with 2,000 pounds of thrust. It had a nice titanium nozzle, an aluminum injector, and an 
ablative thrust chamber–all the things we needed for the SPS because we were looking for the 
simplest, lightest-weight engine we could get. We later used that engine for subscale testing of 
ablative materials and nozzle extensions for the full-scale engine. 
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The general configuration of the SPS engine was 20,000 pounds of thrust, with a chamber 
pressure of 100 psi and specific impulse (Isp) of 314.5. The very large nozzle had an area ratio 
of 62.5:1 (exit area to throat area). The propellants were nitrogen tetroxide (also known as 
N2O4 and nitrous oxide) and A-50. A-50 was a hydrazine family fuel. Aerojet developed it for 
the Titan Missile Program when they went with Titan II, to store it in the launch silos. They 
wanted the highest performance they could get. N2H4 was just pure hydrazine, which doesn’t 
take low temperature very well. In fact, it freezes about like water. We started adding unsym-
metricaldimethylhydrazine (UDMH) to the hydrazine until such time as it would meet the 
environmental specifications the Air Force needed for Titan II. It turned out it’s roughly a 
fifty-fifty mix. We still had to be careful with that fuel because the two fluids didn’t mix very 
well chemically. We had to spray the two fluids through some special nozzles to get them to 
emulsify with each other into a single fluid. If we ever got it too cold or froze it, the hydrazine 
separated back out. Then, if we tried to run the engine, things could go boom in the night.
The inlet pressure was only 165 pounds per square inch absolute (psia), but we needed at 
least forty psi pressure drop across the injector just to get some kind of stable flow. It was a 
whole new game for some of us. We didn’t have much supply pressure to work with. It had the 
aluminum injector to keep the weight down. That was a couple feet in diameter, and we didn’t 
have a lot of propellant to cool it. In fact, we had to use both propellants to keep the injector 
cool. There were twenty-two ring channels in the injector. Specification required 750 seconds 
duration, or fifty engine restarts during a flight. 
There were several first flight things we accomplished with the engine. It was the first ablative 
thrust chamber of any size to fly. (See Slide 6, Appendix G) There were no liners in it. It was 
just straight ablative material. It took us a while to figure that out. It was a throat-gimbaled 
engine, and it was the first engine to fly with columbium (also known as niobium, used as an 
alloying element in steels and superalloys) in the nozzle. 
The first time we fired that assembly, we got a couple of surprises. (See Slide 7, Appendix G) 
The chamber pressure was supposed to be 100 psi. We fired it up, and it ran just fine for about 
a second, then the chamber pressure (Pc) dipped down to forty psi and gradually came back 
up to 100. The engine went on running, but we were holding our breath a little. One of our 
requirements was to use the fuel to actuate the propellant valve. With those low pressures, it 
pulled so much fuel from the inlet of the engine to actuate the valve that there wasn’t enough 
to run the engine for a second or two. The good news was it stayed stable through all of that. 
During these very first firings, we hadn’t received the requirement for dynamic stability, so the 
engine contained an unbaffled injector, and it recovered. It never really ever went unstable. It 
just turns out it was fairly throttleable. 
It was a throat-
gimbaled engine, 
and it was the first 
engine to fly with 
columbium in the 
nozzle.
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There was another unexpected surprise that involved the interface with the actual Service 
Module. The decision for our approach evolved during proposal time. Half of the contractors 
looked at a single engine with redundant controls; others had groups of four and five engines 
for reliability. (See Slide 8, Appendix G) The final contractual decision, from a weight and an 
efficiency standpoint, was to make a single thrust chamber with dual redundant valving to 
assure that we could always get a start, and always get a shutdown. The gimbal actuators, which 
were the other moving parts on the engine, had semi-redundancy. The propellant valve was 
about two feet square and weighed 100 pounds, the biggest valve on which I ever worked. It 
was kind of a mirror image. One side of it was the oxidizer; the other side was the fuel. There 
were four ball valves in each propellant circuit in this arrangement: a fuel ball, a common 
shaft, and an oxidizer ball. The actuator to rotate the shaft was located between the balls. 
There were four of these individual assemblies utilized into a series-parallel configuration. On 
an engine start, any one of those actuators could fail, and the engine would still start. If, on 
shutdown, one of the actuators failed, it would still shutdown. We could run the engine, which 
we normally did with all four sets of valves open, but it would run equally well on one pair in 
each circuit, which we did a lot of in qualification testing.
One of the development challenges we faced didn’t have to do so much with the valve opera-
tion as it did with manufacturing. It was a complex casting with lots of machining. We were 
having them machined outside our plant by a subcontractor, and it was taking him about a 
week to make one casting. Somewhere in the middle of trying to get more castings, Aerojet 
purchased what, at that time, was one of the newest numerically controlled machines with 
multi-axis operations. Management decided they needed something to do with it, so I got 
directed to bring the machining of the valve in-house. We did that, and it took a couple of 
months to get the things all set up. We started machining valves. On the fourth day of the 
six-day cycle, two shifts a day, the machine tool would jam a tool through a side of the casting 
and ruin it. At that time, the machine control was not digital. There was a punched paper tape, 
about one inch wide and over 100 feet long. Every time they would ruin one of those castings, 
they would have to go through that whole tape, make a few changes, and punch out an entire 
new tape. It was three and one-half months before we started getting good castings. After that, 
it worked fine, but it did set us back a little on our schedule.
The other major valve problem was the actuation. We were required to use engine fuel as the 
hydraulic actuator fluid. They wanted to minimize the number of connections that crossed the 
interface between the Service Module and the engine. We were only allowed the main propel-
lant lines and one redundant, electrical cable. That was it. We switched to a pneumatic valve 
actuation because we had to stay in the same envelope, and we couldn’t cross the interface. We 
removed the fuel hydraulic system from the cylinders and put a big spring in there that was 
used to close the valve and an engine-located, high-pressure nitrogen subsystem to pneumati-
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cally open the valve. We were required fifty starts of the engine. The amount of nitrogen we 
had would restart the engine about eighty times. (See Slide 8, Appendix G)
Those were the two major events during valve development. Once we got them going, we had 
the usual problems of seal material in the valve. We started out with Teflon, and it would cold-
flow too much. We finally used some fiberglass-impregnated Teflon materials that would work. 
We had a three-micron finish on those valve balls, and they were each about two and one-half 
inches in diameter. It was a job manufacturing them, but not intolerable. The balls were made 
out of stainless steel. During one of our weight reduction exercises, we got the bright idea to 
make the balls from some lighter-weight material. We tried beryllium, which was about the 
only candidate that was significantly lighter. They worked, except that beryllium is pretty soft, 
and it didn’t have wear life that would meet the mission requirement.
Our injector assembly was about two feet in diameter. It was all aluminum (See Slide 9, 
Appendix G). It had five baffles for the dynamic stability, and I think we did 240 or 250 bomb1 
tests in developing this baffle configuration. The original injector had twenty-two rings. There 
was one main rule in the fabrication of the injector: we had to keep parent material between 
the propellants. There couldn’t be any weld that both propellants could touch. With the low 
pressures and the big surface area to cool, we didn’t have much room left for lands between 
the rings. That was a problem. When we went to the baffles, we had to reduce the number of 
channels down to fifteen. When we started injector development, because of the narrow land 
area, we thought we would have a welding problem, so we decided we would braze the injector. 
Well, it turns out there were about 200 linear inches of area that had to be brazed. If we didn’t 
have it perfectly cleaned and perfectly aligned,we didn’t get a perfect braze. We never got a 
brazed injector that was 100 percent leak-free.  
About that time, NASA was still looking at the future Nova launch vehicle, and Aerojet had 
the contract for the M-1 engine for the Nova’s second stage. It was 1 million-plus-one-pound 
thrust hydrogen/oxygen engine. Aerojet had bought an electron beam welder for use on the 
program. When the M-1 got canceled, it sat in a corner, doing nothing. We decided we would 
give it a shot at welding the SPS injector, and it worked quite well. After we started firing the 
injectors for long periods of time, we encountered a problem that became a phenomenon in 
very low-pressure, large engines with the particular propellant combination we had. We named 
it “popping.” We would start the engine up and we never knew when, but if we were watching 
the chamber pressure (Pc) trace on the oscillograph, all of a sudden, the trace would expand 
1 Here the ‘bomb’ refers to an impulse charge to induce instability in the combustion chamber for assessing the 
engine’s susceptibility to combustion instability. 
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into a little football-like bubble. Then, it would go away. It would just last a few milliseconds. 
But, every time it would make a bubble, to us in the test bay, it sounded like a “pop;” hence, 
the name “popping.” Eventually, it became a large-enough concern that NASA convened 
a meeting at North American Aviation, Inc., and brought all the stability experts from the 
universities, and we spent two days talking about that. I thought, “Boy, I’m finally going to get 
some help.” The next day, I got the results. They told me they didn’t like the name “popping.” 
We eventually solved it. At the low pressures and the low pressure drop across the injector, the 
length of the drilled orifice became critical, and the propellant stream sometimes would come 
out clean, and sometimes would attach to the edge of the orifice, causing some propellant to 
flow onto the injector face. When the propellant stream ran along the injector face, it changed 
the combustion characteristics of the element, and it would cause the pop. It never hurt the 
engine, but the first few times really worried us. We counter-drilled those and got a shorter, 
fixed-length orifice that solved the problem.
We had to do the bomb tests to check the dynamic stability. That turned out to be relatively 
easy to do. We had to worry more about damage to the injector from bomb fragments than 
from anything else. The ablative chamber had no kind of liners or anything inside; it consisted 
only of laid-up ablative material with some fluted aluminum flanges at each end (See Slide 10, 
Appendix G). At the time we started the program, and even back in the old Saint Program, we 
didn’t have nice impregnated tape like they do today. The coated glass fiber string material was 
made in whatever length rolls you wanted. The continuous string was a little bit bigger around 
than a piece of heavy kite string. Whatever thickness chamber we wanted, we’d cut that length 
of strings and lay them on a piece of sticky tape. All of them were hand laid, side-by-side-by-
side. The tape with the strings was then wound around the chamber mandrel (a spindle to 
support the piece during machining) and impregnated. We did that until the ablative mate-
rial industry progressed and developed the flat tape. The flat tape made the chamber lighter 
because the ratio of the glass to resin was a lot greater, and provided more heat-dissipating 
capacity. This allowed the chamber wall to be thinner. 
The next major component on the engine was the gimbal actuator. This particular actuator 
is a semi-redundant device. I say “semi” because the main actuator movement device was a 
single ball screw, much like that used in present-day car steering mechanisms. The ball screw 
was operated by two electric motors transmitting power through magnetic particle clutches. 
One motor/clutch assembly extended the actuator, and one retracted the actuator. There was a 
completely redundant set of motors and clutches in each actuator for mission reliability. During 
engine operation, all four motor/clutch assemblies were running, and control signals from the 
spacecraft activated a specific magnetic clutch for the desired engine position. A couple of our 
problems with the actuator didn’t have anything to do with technical accomplishment. At 
the time we got the contract for the SPS engine, we planned to subcontract the actuator to a 
We had to worry 
more about 
damage to the 
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company called Lear Inc. in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Lear was the biggest actuator company 
in the U.S. at that time; all Boeing and McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company airplanes used 
Lear actuators for moving controls surfaces and flaps. They had the best reputation for that. 
We gave them a contract, and they went to work.  
The actuator assembly had to be enclosed in a pressurized, hermetically sealed can. (See Slide 
11, Appendix G). The electric motors and the magnetic clutches wouldn’t work in the vacuum 
of space. After a year or so, we received a pair of actuators to start testing. Both units were 
overweight and larger than the required envelope. Right about that time, another company by 
the name of Siegler bought Lear. The Lear group kept working the size and weight condition, 
along with a stiffness problem. Then, Siegler bought another company called Jack and Heintz 
Motor in Cleveland. Well, the Lear plant was overloaded with work; they didn’t want to build 
a new building, and the Jack and Heintz plant in Cleveland had lots of empty space. Lear/
Siegler moved the actuator program to Cleveland. This was a problem because the actuator 
engineers wouldn’t move to Cleveland. All of a sudden, we had this contract with about half 
the money spent, but we didn’t have a part, and we didn’t have an engineering staff anymore. 
About that time, North American Aviation and NASA were getting nervous enough that they 
decided we’d better find another actuator company. Meanwhile, a couple of people who had 
worked at Lear had gone to work for an actuator company down in Costa Mesa, California, 
called Cadillac Gage. They were building actuators for the nozzles on the Polaris missile under 
contract from Aerojet, and had produced good hardware. The ex-Lear people talked to the 
Cadillac Gage management, and they gave us a bid to build the actuator. At that point, NASA 
and North American interceded and said, “We have already spent half the money. We can’t 
afford that again. You are directed to give a fixed-price contract.” We gave them a fixed-price 
contract, and they started to work. 
Then, the second problem we found on the Lear actuators resurfaced. The stiffness require-
ment for the actuator was to be a spring rate of 300,000 inch-pounds to meet the vehicle 
control system loop frequency. The stiffness on the two actuators we’d received from the old Lear 
Company and the first two from Cadillac Gage were well below requirements. One of them 
was about 220,000 inch-pounds; the other one was 160,000. By then, the second company had 
used up all their fixed-price money and a little bit more. They said, “Sorry, but we have to stop 
work.” It became a contractual battle for a while. It eventually was resolved. About that time, 
back at NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., Joe Shea, then the chief engineer of the 
Apollo Program, was reviewing his overall Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) 
chart, and the actuator popped up as the umbrella for the whole Apollo Program, because if we 
didn’t have that, the vehicles didn’t go. Shea came to visit us one day. We went through every-
thing with him. The North American guys were there and everything. After the review, they all 
went back to North American and said they would call us with their recommendations. 
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The next afternoon I got a call that said, “Don’t bother to come down. The problem is solved.” 
I said, “What happened?” My 300,000-pound actuator was being tied to a 90,000 inch-pound 
spring rate bracket on the Service Module. It didn’t make any difference as long as my spring 
rate was over 100. By then, we’d worked for almost two and one-half years trying to get that 
thing stiff, so we hadn’t performed life testing on the motors and magnetic particle clutches. 
The clutches became the next challenge. There had never been a magnetic clutch that big. 
Existing technology were little things, less than three-quarter inches in diameter. This one was 
not quite three inches in diameter. As you might expect, we found we had overheating and 
other problems. We got it all done, but the problem illustrates the fact that sometimes you run 
into events that have nothing to do with your engineering capability. My final challenge out of 
the actuator development was the boss saying, “Okay, go get out of that fixed-price contract.” 
If you’ve read government contracting regulations, you know there’s no way you could do that. 
I had to figure out a whole different contracting scheme so we could get Cadillac Gage back to 
work. (See Slide 11, Appendix G.)
The first nozzle for the Service Propulsion System engine was developed out of Saint and 
AbleStar technology. The nozzle was made out of titanium. We calculated that the area ratio 
at the head end was about 6:1 as the point where exit temperatures would be down to tita-
nium capabilities for radiation cooling. The exit area ratio was 62:1. The first problem came 
with fabrication of the gores. It takes sixteen gores to make one nozzle. Our nozzle fabrication 
contractor’s plan was to hot stretch-form the titanium, make a mold of the shape we needed, 
and use Calrod® units (elongated heating elements) to make it hot. That, in turn, would heat 
the titanium stretched over it. That didn’t work too well. We were using titanium for the nozzle 
because it took lots of temperature. We had to get it very hot to stretch-form it. Titanium has 
a tremendous memory. It doesn’t want to stay in a new place. It kept wanting to go back to its 
original flat shape when it cooled. We were in a quandary about that. We had only been able 
to make four gores that were even halfway close. We gave them to our subcontractor who was 
developing the technique for welding them all together. We were scratching our heads about 
what to do when one of those fortuitous events occurred.  
About the same time we started scratching our heads, the then-president of our company was 
at a cocktail party in Washington, D.C., and he got to talking with the good lady senator from 
Maine. She said, “Dan, I gave you a bunch of money, supported you for that Apollo thing, 
but you’re not putting any of that work in my state.” I then got a memo that said, “Go see if 
they do anything in Maine that’ll help your engine program along.” I put all my problems in 
my briefcase and went and found a little guy in Maine who worried about the state’s economic 
development. He listened to me for about half a day and said, “We’ve got nothing like that up 
here. But, two weeks ago, there was a guy in here wanting us to help him start a small fishing 
boat business. He wants to make them out of aluminum, and they’re all nice and round, instead 
We were 
scratching our 
heads about what 
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of square. He had a machine that makes stuff kind of round and long like you’re describing.” I 
got the boat maker’s name and an address, which was down in Massachusetts.
When I got to the address, it was at a road crossing with a little building about the size of an 
old outhouse sitting there and that was it. Finally, about a mile away, I found an old cotton mill 
from back in the textile days, and here was this little, old Norwegian toolmaker, and he had 
built this big machine. He was making boat parts, specifically the double-curved part of the 
bow. Well, he hadn’t been able to sell the boat business, so he had taken a couple of contracts 
to make gores for radar antennas.  
Those gores, curved two ways, weren’t too different from what was needed for the nozzle. I 
described what I needed and he said, “Yeah, I think I can do that. Send me a mold and send 
me some material.” We did. Probably a month or six weeks later, he called and said, “Come on 
back. I’ll show you what’s going on.” We went back to his shop in Massachusetts, and he had 
been working with his machine, and he had made a bunch of gores out of aluminum while he 
was working. So, I was going to be there for the first titanium pull. When we had tried the hot 
stretch-forming, we had to work with one big sheet of titanium. The boat maker’s new process 
worked so efficiently, he could cut the sheet diagonally and we could get two gores out of every 
sheet. He laid the sheet out on his machine, brushed on a lubricant from a nearby pot sitting 
on a hot plate, and started the machine. It was a cold-working process, and the machine put 
that titanium through something like old washing machine washer rollers. He could vary the 
axis of the rollers and their distance apart. The machine put that titanium through a little S 
curve about two inches high; it took away all its old form memory and put in a new one.  
The very first one that rolled out the end of that machine looked perfect to me, better than 
any I had seen. We laid it on the mold, and he got a little hammer and went all over it. “Well, 
it’s not right. There’s one little place that sounds a little different,” he said. He went over and 
tweaked his machine, put the same part back in there, ran it through again and had a perfect 
part. I said, “How many of those could you make a day?” He replied, “I can probably make 
twenty of them in a day.” I said, “How much?” He said, “Fifty bucks apiece, if you supply the 
metal.” That was the last gore I got from him for three and one-half months because his busi-
ness didn’t exactly meet NASA 200-2 quality specifications. I had to create a Quality Depart-
ment, a Purchasing Department, all of the “isms” and documentation to certify the parts were 
useable for nozzle fabrication. But, by then, that problem was solved, so I didn’t worry about 
it anymore.  
We finally got a nozzle together, and because of the size and the pressure, the only place that 
you could hot-fire test it was in the big Air Force altitude facility at Tullahoma, Tennessee. I 
talked recently to a gentleman who works at Arnold Engineering Development Center, and 
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we decided the tests were conducted at the facility’s J-3 cell, a very tall structure, that was used. 
I found out later when we got the test cell operating satisfactorily, that firing the SPS engine 
caused the test stand to flex and caused misalignment of the performance measuring instru-
mentation. The thrust and side forces measuring cells had to be biased for the thrust stand 
movement so we could get accurate test data. Around early 1964, we got the first altitude 
engine all together and set up at Tullahoma. For the first engine firing, I was sitting in the 
control room with one of the North American Aviation guys. We heard the big countdown 
going on, and they finally said, “Fire.” We were looking at our oscilloscope and nothing seemed 
to be happening. We thought, “Man, that engine runs awfully smooth.” Then, somebody 
said, “Okay, fire that engine,” and they threw the SPS start switch. It turned out the whole 
countdown was for the rocket engine injector they were developing to pull the tunnel down to 
altitude. That was the big thing to them. We were going to fire the SPS engine for fifty seconds 
as a checkout. We noticed a little decay in thrust level after ten to fifteen seconds. But, then, 
it leveled right off and everything was fine, and we thought we had a successful run because 
everything looked very good. 
As expected, the nozzle got very hot. Things finally cooled down, and we were able to get in 
the cell. It had gotten hot all right – too hot. The whole nozzle had moved forward about 
eighteen inches. About ten inches down, the nozzle had curled right back over itself. We had a 
nice, big S curve all around and a nozzle that was a foot and one-half shorter. That’s when we 
figured out we needed columbium. The only reason we found columbium is when titanium 
wouldn’t work, we went to the periodic table of the chemistry book and said, “Okay, what’s 
the next lightest metal?” We determined it needed to handle at least 2,100 degrees Farenheit. 
We were running around 1,900 degrees at the nozzle attach point, and columbium appeared 
to be capable. Then, we tried to find some columbium. It turns out the nuclear power industry 
used columbium to make the rods in which they put the nuclear material for power plants. We 
went to the company that was making those rods.
The company was called Wah Chang, in Albany, Oregon, and was owned by a very nice 
Chinese gentleman. We wanted thin material. All the material he made was one-half inch or 
more plates. He thought he could make us some thinner stuff. We wanted it forty-thousandths 
(0.040)of an inch thick. He was able to produce the thinner sheet stock we required. The 
titanium nozzle had a machine flange on the front. We tried to follow the same design. We 
were going to make a flange out of columbium also, but nobody had ever made anything like 
that out of columbium. They had always used the flat roll stock. But we found a company that 
would try to make a casting. They had a big, spin-casting rig. That flange was around twenty 
inches in diameter. After making a casting, it turned out they never had machined columbium, 
and it is extremely tough to machine. They could get about two cuts around the flange with 
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one, good silicon carbide tool, then it was shot. We later got rid of the flange and figured out 
an attachment where we could just roll a lip on the end of the nozzle sheet material and clamp 
it to the end of the ablative chamber. While they were busy making sheet metal stock for the 
full-scale nozzle assemblies, we got a small piece of columbium and just rolled it up to make 
a small regular conical nozzle. We put that on the Apollo subscale engine and took it down to 
Tullahoma to see how the columbium worked. We fired a partial simulated SPS duty cycle. 
That was 200 seconds firing and one half-hour coast, then re-fire. Everything went fine until 
the re-fire, when the thrust level was not where it should have been. We opened up the tunnel, 
and the nozzle was gone about two inches down from the flange. It was just all jagged.
We determined that the temperatures to which we raised the columbium caused it to absorb 
hydrogen from what little atmosphere there was in test cell. The hydrogen crystallized the 
columbium. The inside of the nozzle, next to the fire, was clean and nice–no penetration there. 
But, on the outside, you could see a crystalline surface. The engine re-starting shock had shat-
tered the nozzle.  
Operating the engine out in space would have been fine, no hydrogen. But, we had to develop 
and qualify the engine here on the ground. We had to find some way to protect the columbium 
so it could pass all the tests. We went through about twenty different coating materials and 
finally found one that North American Aircraft Division was using in some of the jet engines 
exit areas. We still had the same problem. We had to get the columbium up to 1,800 degrees 
to bake the coating on. There were ovens big enough to get up to the temperature we needed, 
but none of them had vacuum capability. Finally, working with North American Aviation, we 
developed a big retort (a closed laboratory vessel) that we could set the nozzle in, weld it all 
closed, pressure-test it, put in an inert atmosphere, and, then, put that whole business in the 
big oven. Remember, that nozzle was about ten feet tall and about eight feet in diameter. Facili-
ties with the capability to heat and bake the large assembly for several hours were not readily 
available. Final nozzle configuration used columbium down to about the 40:1 area ratio, then 
titanium the rest of the way to the end. There were some quite unique issues in developing 
the welds between columbium and titanium. We welded them together using titanium rod. 
Micrographs of weld samples looked like there was no bond between the columbium and the 
titanium. Columbium material surface appeared just as smooth as it was before welding. But 
whenever we performed pull tests of joint samples, failure occurred in the weld-heat affected 
zone of the titanium. Whatever went on in there was strong. It worked well.  
The SPS engine flew nineteen times. (See Slide 13, Appendix G). The most starts probably 
were performed on three of the engines, eight starts per engine, with 6,000 seconds of total 
time. In the overall development program, I know we tested more than 200 injectors. I think 
we had about 230 bomb tests. We went through 124 different injector patterns to get one that 
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was totally compatible with the ablative material without any liners, and still approached the 
98 percent combustion efficiency we needed without making any grooves down the ablative 
chamber. All in all, the total testing during the development and qualification totaled about 
twenty-eight hours on the engine assembly. That’s a long time for that small engine.  
Just before the launch of the Apollo 8 mission, which took the first men out around the moon, 
Tom Paine was the acting administrator of NASA. He called George Mueller, who was the 
associate administrator for manned space flight. He said, “George, are you sure that engine is 
going to start? Find out.” Mueller sent a team off to study the engine. The results of his study 
were the reason I knew the engine would start. He said, “There have been over 3,200 starts of 
that engine in development and qualification. There were only four times it didn’t start, and 
those were all due to test stand stuff.” The engine had started every time all through the devel-
opment and qualification program. When I used to go to my little hometown in north Idaho, 
which was a long way from the space program, some of guys back there would ask me what 
I was working on. I told them, and they said, “What if it doesn’t start?” I said, “It’ll start. I’ll 
lay it out for you. You probably start your car an average of three times a day. In a year, you’ve 
started it a thousand times. I’ll bet you at least once, it doesn’t go hmmmm, and, then, it’s going 
to grind a little. That’s one failure in a thousand.” The specification I was working with was one 
failure in 5 million starts. So, I knew it was going to work as long as North American Aviation 
put that electrical cable on correctly. 
 
---------------------------------------
Editor’s Note: The following information reflects a question-and-answer session held after  Boyce’s 
presentation. 
QUESTION: You had your fuel and your oxidizer in one valve assembly; would you do that 
differently now or did that work well enough?
BOYCE: It worked very well because the two independent castings had a cavity in between 
them. We had dual seals on each shaft where they went into the cavity/actuating area, and that 
area was vented. There never was a problem there. The biggest difficulty they had with respect 
to propellants was decontamination between the series ball valves after engine testing. There is 
a similar arrangement on Aerojet’s Orbital Maneuvering System engine on the space shuttle. 
There is not a bi-propellant issue. Between the two series valves, there’s always a little propel-
lant trapped on landing, and they have to decontaminate those areas before returning to the 
hangar. Obviously, we didn’t have that situation after an SPS engine flight. Nobody got that 
near to it.
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QUESTION: Out of those 6,400 seconds, what percentage would you say was development 
versus qualification?
BOYCE: I would say probably 50 percent to 60 percent of those seconds were logged in 
development prior to starting qualification. There were some additional development tests in 
parallel with qualification testing to evaluate issues that arose during qualification. Here’s a 
little summary of development and qualification: 216 injectors in the program, 3,200 firings, 
and 700 minutes of time on injectors; nozzle extensions, thirty-one units made, 1,400 firings 
for a total of 700 minutes. We made 274 combustion chambers, with 1,400 firings on the 
thrust chamber, and about 900 minutes of test time. We had twenty-seven total engine assem-
blies and 4,000 firings of the all-up engine assembly, which totaled about 1,700 minutes.
QUESTION: Early on in the design concept, did you have abort requirements already factored 
in or did those come later? That is, could you use the engine as an abort?
BOYCE: I think in one of the first Earth orbit manned launches, there was an early shutdown 
problem with one of the Saturn stages; they fired the SPS engine to put the Command/Service 
Module into orbit. It wasn’t planned to be that way. During Earth orbit missions, the SPS 
was fired for engine operating characteristics tests, orbit corrections, and de-orbit. Remember, 
the original concept was that it would never fire until the astronauts were ready to come 
home from the moon. It did, of course, take over midcourse corrections; lunar orbit insertion 
and Earth return orbit insertion after they went to the LEM concept. After adopting LEM, 
there were no specification changes that changed the engine capability of fifty starts and 750 
seconds total firing time. They did change the mission duty cycle firing schedule to match 
the LEM scenario. During the qualification program, an “abort” firing of 610 seconds was 
demonstrated. Worst-case mission requirements were thirty-six starts and 546 seconds of burn 
time - well within original specification.
STEVE FISHER2: So, apparently it wasn’t part of the requirement, but the capability was 
there in terms of numbers of seconds. 
2  Steve Fisher served as facilitator during the On the Shoulders of Giants seminar series.
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Lunar Module Descent Engine
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Clay Boyce’s Presentation Viewgraphs
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